锘縏Y  - RPRT
AU  - Milligan, Vivienne
AU  - Gurran, Nicole
AU  - Lawson, Julie
AU  - Phibbs, Peter
AU  - Phillips, Rhonda
CY  - Melbourne
KW  - Housing affordability 
L1  - internal-pdf://0109319841/AHURI_Final_Report_No134_Innovation in afforda.pdf
M1  - 60504
M3  - FR
N1  - This research focuses on policy and practice to support growth of not-for-profit housing organisations as a key strategy for addressing the gap in supply of affordable rental accommodation.
The authors also consider the likely effectiveness of NRAS as a mechanism for securing the volume of public and private funds which they find are required to

address supply shortages (151). They propose a number of amendments which could improve the effectiveness of NRAS for supporting the not-for-profit housing sector.
Based on their analysis of the Australian housing context and the international financing mechanisms, Milligan et al. (Milligan et al. 2009) find that the most significant issue facing community housing associations is their ability to secure long-term finance. Not-for-profit housing associations need secure and long-term access to finance in order to grow and be viable.
Milligan et al. (2009) judge that NRAS goes some way to providing a flexible funding source, as funds can be allocated as a one off capital grant or as an ongoing subsidy for up to 10 years. A negative characteristic is that NRAS has a short life span (10 years) and is available to the broader market (152).
First, the authors suggest that a certain percentage of NRAS should be set aside for the not-for-profit sector as this will capitalise on the capacity building already taking place, deliver cost-effectiveness and is the most reliable way to secure affordable housing beyond the 10 year life of the scheme, given that the sector will retain some if not all of its stock (152). NRAS also provides an opportunity for states to strategically tie not-for-profit finance to the grants (already occurring in NSW and SA) and achieve greater economies of scale.
Secondly, the authors recommend that governments facilitate wholesale private fund raising on behalf of not-for-profits (either through NRAS incentives, bond financing or government guarantees), which would prove more cost-effective than individual organisations leveraging their own funds (152).
However the authors warn that leveraging private funds using the present NRAS structure will undermine the viability of affordable housing as dwellings may need to be sold after the 10 year lifespan of the scheme to service debt. This loss of a significant amount of supply will work against community housing providers as they will lose capital that could be used to leverage more funds as well as housing that could be used to meet affordable housing needs (152-153).

This section presents evidence from comparative research on the regulatory operations of the not-for-profit sector in the Netherlands and Austria, building on the case studies detailed in the previous section. 53
Milligan et al. (2009) compare and contrast Austria鈥檚 limited profit housing model that has contributed to a maintaining a stable housing market and preventing over-inflated housing prices and the Netherland鈥檚 not-for-profit housing sector (130).
As we have seen from the previous section, both jurisdictions enjoy a financially healthy social housing operation, the Netherlands so much so that they no longer require ongoing government funding to remain viable. However, as Milligan et al. (2009) and Lawson and Elsinga (2008) find below, the introduction of self-regulation in the Netherlands has resulted in a loss of accountability. Indeed, these authors argue that the social dimension of social housing in the Netherlands has been eroded and presently community housing agencies fail those people they are charged with assisting.
Austria鈥檚 model has three core characteristics. The first is the long term involvement of central and local governments in land banking, and their provision of public loans and conditional grants to ensure scale and quality of production. The second is the well established and streamlined use of financial intermediaries that ensure the channelling of funds to affordable housing projects. The third is a well regulated delivery system that is deemed successful because of the numerous, well performing not-for-profit housing associations (130).
Social landlords are incorporated companies and own 22.5 per cent of the housing market in Austria. There are more than 190 limited profit housing associations (LPHA) that manage on average 3,900 dwellings each and are professionally managed, creditworthy and on the whole financially viable (131). They are exempt from company tax, have preferred access to subsidised loans and operate at a scale that facilitates operational efficiencies (131).
The
researchers have identified five features that make these organisations successful social landlords.


NV  - 60504
PB  - Australian Housing and Urban 漫天堂入口 Institute Limited
PY  - 2009
RP  - This research focuses on policy and practice to support growth of not-for-profit housing organisations as a key strategy for addressing the gap in supply of affordable rental accommodation.
The authors also consider the likely effectiveness of NRAS as a mechanism for securing the volume of public and private funds which they find are required to

address supply shortages (151). They propose a number of amendments which could improve the effectiveness of NRAS for supporting the not-for-profit housing sector.
Based on their analysis of the Australian housing context and the international financing mechanisms, Milligan et al. (Milligan et al. 2009) find that the most significant issue facing community housing associations is their ability to secure long-term finance. Not-for-profit housing associations need secure and long-term access to finance in order to grow and be viable.
Milligan et al. (2009) judge that NRAS goes some way to providing a flexible funding source, as funds can be allocated as a one off capital grant or as an ongoing subsidy for up to 10 years. A negative characteristic is that NRAS has a short life span (10 years) and is available to the broader market (152).
First, the authors suggest that a certain percentage of NRAS should be set aside for the not-for-profit sector as this will capitalise on the capacity building already taking place, deliver cost-effectiveness and is the most reliable way to secure affordable housing beyond the 10 year life of the scheme, given that the sector will retain some if not all of its stock (152). NRAS also provides an opportunity for states to strategically tie not-for-profit finance to the grants (already occurring in NSW and SA) and achieve greater economies of scale.
Secondly, the authors recommend that governments facilitate wholesale private fund raising on behalf of not-for-profits (either through NRAS incentives, bond financing or government guarantees), which would prove more cost-effective than individual organisations leveraging their own funds (152).
However the authors warn that leveraging private funds using the present NRAS structure will undermine the viability of affordable housing as dwellings may need to be sold after the 10 year lifespan of the scheme to service debt. This loss of a significant amount of supply will work against community housing providers as they will lose capital that could be used to leverage more funds as well as housing that could be used to meet affordable housing needs (152-153).

This section presents evidence from comparative research on the regulatory operations of the not-for-profit sector in the Netherlands and Austria, building on the case studies detailed in the previous section. 53
Milligan et al. (2009) compare and contrast Austria鈥檚 limited profit housing model that has contributed to a maintaining a stable housing market and preventing over-inflated housing prices and the Netherland鈥檚 not-for-profit housing sector (130).
As we have seen from the previous section, both jurisdictions enjoy a financially healthy social housing operation, the Netherlands so much so that they no longer require ongoing government funding to remain viable. However, as Milligan et al. (2009) and Lawson and Elsinga (2008) find below, the introduction of self-regulation in the Netherlands has resulted in a loss of accountability. Indeed, these authors argue that the social dimension of social housing in the Netherlands has been eroded and presently community housing agencies fail those people they are charged with assisting.
Austria鈥檚 model has three core characteristics. The first is the long term involvement of central and local governments in land banking, and their provision of public loans and conditional grants to ensure scale and quality of production. The second is the well established and streamlined use of financial intermediaries that ensure the channelling of funds to affordable housing projects. The third is a well regulated delivery system that is deemed successful because of the numerous, well performing not-for-profit housing associations (130).
Social landlords are incorporated companies and own 22.5 per cent of the housing market in Austria. There are more than 190 limited profit housing associations (LPHA) that manage on average 3,900 dwellings each and are professionally managed, creditworthy and on the whole financially viable (131). They are exempt from company tax, have preferred access to subsidised loans and operate at a scale that facilitates operational efficiencies (131).
The
researchers have identified five features that make these organisations successful social landlords.


ST  - Innovation in affordable housing in Australia: Bringing policy and practice for not-for-profit housing organisations together
T2  - 漫天堂入口Final Report No. 134
TI  - Innovation in affordable housing in Australia: Bringing policy and practice for not-for-profit housing organisations together
UR  - /research/final-reports/134
ID  - 25
ER  -